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Abstract 
 
This study uses a hazard model with data on 3392 corporate bankruptcies by U.S. 
public companies during 1983–2008 to determine the effect of industry-based 
structural constraints on bankruptcy predictions. The probability of bankruptcy is 
significantly higher for firms in highly concentrated industries and with relatively 
stronger customer dependency. Most bankruptcy predictions reflect the variation of a 
firm’s characteristics relative to its industry, but industry-specific characteristics have 
negligible impacts. The investigation also includes a comparison of the relative 
performance of accounting and market-based variables, in terms of both in-sample fit 
and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. For yearly data, the best model includes both 
accounting and market-based variables. However, for monthly market data and 
quarterly accounting reports, the best model features only market data. The usefulness 
of accounting measures in bankruptcy prediction models thus may be contingent on 
sampling frequency.  
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1. Introduction 
Two factors likely determine the forecasting accuracy of corporate bankruptcy 
hazard rate models. Specifically, we are interested in the effects of the intensity of 
competition and the degree of connection with customers and suppliers in a given 
industry, as well as potential distortions in accounting information across different 
time spans (e.g., quarterly versus yearly reports). If accounting signals in financial 
reports are less informative at the quarterly than at the yearly level, the latter should 
provide more accurate bankruptcy forecasting. Moreover, industry structural 
constraints should affect firms’ operating strategies, financial structure decisions, and 
profitability, and therefore their bankruptcy likelihood. Maksimovic and Phillips 
(1998) indicate that bankruptcy reflects industry demand conditions, and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) provide empirical support but use only dummy variables, without 
discussing specific factors. We instead determine just how bankruptcy might be 
influenced by a set of structural constraints within each industry.  
Growing research based on hazard rate models compares the relative merits of 
accounting and market-driven variables for bankruptcy forecasting. Shumway (2001) 
finds that combining the two can produce accurate forecasts; Chava and Jarrow (2004) 
instead suggest that monthly and quarterly observations significantly improve the 
forecasting performance of both accounting and market-based models, compared with 
yearly observations. This result is consistent with the idea that timely information 
provision is particularly useful in forecasting bankruptcy. However, the contribution 
of accounting variables grows negligible in the presence of market variables; we 
therefore consider whether previous results still hold when we rely on an extended 
database and a more recent period.1 
                                                 
1 Our database contains 3392 bankruptcies between 1983 and 2008; Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) 
database featured 1461 bankruptcies between 1962 and 1999. 
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To assess the effect of an industry’s structural constraints on bankruptcy 
predictions, we consider corporate bankruptcies by U.S. public companies during the 
period from 1983 to 2008. Our in-sample tests include the full sample; for our 
out-of-sample tests, we use data from 1983–1999 to fit the hazard model, then adopt 
the estimated coefficients to forecast bankruptcies during 2000–2008. Both the in- and 
out-of-sample tests indicate that the probability of bankruptcy is significantly higher 
for firms in highly concentrated industries, compared with similar firms in industries 
with lower degrees of concentration. We also find that firms that depend more on 
customers have higher bankruptcy probabilities than firms with lower dependency 
levels. Both findings highlight the risks inherent in low flexibility, whether in the kind 
of product offered to the market (i.e., concentrated industries tend to produce 
specialized products) or the customers served. We also find that our ability to predict 
bankruptcy depends almost completely on the variation of a firm’s characteristics 
from its industry; industry-specific characteristics instead have a negligible impact on 
this accuracy level.  
Regarding the relative performance of accounting and market variables, both in 
their in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, we find that models based 
on yearly data have 25% more explanatory power on average than models based on 
monthly and quarterly data. When using yearly data, the best model (in and 
out-of-sample) includes both accounting and market-based variables, but if we 
employ monthly market data and quarterly accounting data, the best model only 
includes market data. On the one hand, this finding suggests potential distortions in 
quarterly accounting signals, for which financial reporting flexibility is much wider 
than it is at the yearly level. This flexibility may allow managers to produce quarterly 
reports that fail to reflect the underlying economic fundamentals, such that the 
usefulness of accounting measures in bankruptcy prediction models may be 
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contingent on sampling frequency. On the other hand, an alternative explanation is 
based on the hypotheses that market prices reflect all publicly available information 
regarding bankruptcy because for monthly data, market variables are updated more 
quickly than are the quarterly accounting variables. For yearly data, updating of both 
market and accounting variables occurs at the same frequency. 
In turn, we contribute to empirical literature on bankruptcy prediction in several 
ways. We confirm the importance of accounting for the degree of concentration in the 
industry, the dependency of customers, and the firm’s characteristics relative to its 
industry when forecasting bankruptcies. We note the relative explanatory power of 
market and accounting variables in hazard models and document differences when 
using yearly or quarterly accounting data; we recommend the former in terms of its 
forecasting ability. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we relate relevant 
literature to our hypotheses about the effect of industry constraints in bankruptcy 
prediction. Then in Section 3, we define our data. Section 4 contains the bankruptcy 
prediction model and a discussion of the empirical results, both in-sample and 
out-of-sample, and Section 5 offers the model of within- and across-industry variables. 
We conclude in Section 6. 
2. Bankruptcy Prediction with Internal and External Industry Constraints  
Previous literature has noted the correlation between bankruptcy likelihood and a 
firm’s capital structure; see Titman and Wessels (1988). Although Chava and Jarrow 
(2004) provide empirical evidence of the importance of industry effects, as far as we 
know, the actual influence of industry characteristics on bankruptcy likelihood has not 
been addressed. To investigate this point, we measure structural constraints both 
within and across industries; accordingly, we propose two hypotheses with respect to 
internal and external industry constraints.  
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2.1. Internal Industry Constraints 
Industrial organization literature reveals that the structure of product markets 
affects managers’ operating decisions (Brander and Lewis, 1986). The consequences 
of operating decisions may affect the risk of a firm’s cash flows and therefore stock 
returns. The structure of product markets also determines firms’ capital structure 
choices and therefore their leverage risk. Firms with a high leverage risk are more 
likely to file for bankruptcy, given their high level of debt compared with their equity.  
Opler and Titman (1994) argue that customers are more reluctant to purchase 
products from a distressed firm with specialized products that may need servicing. 
Because firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to produce specialized 
products, they become more vulnerable to financial distress. In concentrated 
industries and weak economies, highly leveraged firms thus tend to lose more market 
share than do conservatively financed competitors, which implies even greater losses 
for financially distressed firms in concentrated industries. 
In line with risk-based return considerations, Hou and Robinson (2006) posit that 
lower expected returns for firms in highly concentrated industries result because they 
face fewer risks. A conventional view suggests that firms that bear more risk need to 
provide higher returns as compensation, though Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 
(2008) empirically contradict that claim. Financially distressed stocks deliver 
anomalously lower returns but much higher standard deviations, market betas, and 
loadings on value and small-cap risk factors than do stocks with low default risk. In 
other words, firms with lower returns may have higher, not lower, risks. In turn, the 
relationship between the degree of industry concentration and firm risk remains an 
open question for empirical investigation.  
Overall, firms in highly concentrated industries may be more likely to file for 
bankruptcy for two reasons. First, they tend to become more leveraged than firms in 
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less concentrated industries. Second, firms in concentrated industries provide low 
average stock returns but suffer from relatively high volatility, as suggested by 
Campbell et al. (2008). We hypothesize in turn that 
Hypothesis 1: The higher an industry’s concentration ratio, the higher the 
incidence of bankruptcy among its firms. 
To proxy for the degree of concentration in an industry, we employ its 
concentration ratio, or the inverse of the intensity of industrial competition. We use a 
Herfindahl index to measure the degree of industry concentration in industry j as 
follows: 
2
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where sij is the market share of firm i in industry j. Small values imply that the market 
contains many competing firms; large values imply that few large firms dominate the 
market. To construct the Herfindahl measure, we use the entire distribution of 
industry market share (i.e., net sales) information to assess the degree of industry 
concentration. For this study, we compute the Herfindahl index for each year (yearly 
data set) or month (monthly data set) and for each industry. Because the industry’s 
internal constraint is the competition between producers in the same market seeking 
the same business, the inverse Herfindahl index offers a good proxy of industry 
internal constraints. 
2.2  External Industry Constraints 
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) argue that financial distress at one firm 
links not only to the product market (internal industry) but also to external industries, 
because firms connect with customers and suppliers in other (external) industries. We 
thus consider how external industry constraints may influence bankruptcies, 
especially in relation to customers and suppliers. Although a firm’s customers and 
suppliers might belong to the same industry as the focal firm, our hypothesis refers 
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only to those in other industries.  
The trade-off theory of capital structure implies that the actions of distressed 
firms’ customers and suppliers increase indirect costs and can worsen financial 
distress or even result in bankruptcies. On the one hand, when customers confront a 
supplier in distress, they likely impose costs and find new suppliers to replace it, due 
to their concerns about product quality, reduced warranty value, continuity of supply, 
and serviceability. On the other hand, when suppliers find a customer in financial 
distress, they may impose costs by failing to supply trade credit, backing away from 
long-term contracts, or delaying shipments. This viewpoint emphasizes the potential 
importance of indirect costs, such that we anticipate that firms that depend more on 
their customers and suppliers suffer higher indirect costs when in financial distress. In 
more general terms, a firm with greater dependence on its customers and suppliers has 
more chances to interact with them in all states of nature, including in distress states. 
However, the magnitude of the indirect costs is difficult to estimate.  
Burt (1988) offers that the competitive advantages of firms increase with the 
weakness of the connections among customers and suppliers in their industry. Burt 
(1983, 1988), Talmud (1994), and Yasuda (2005) further suggest that both customer 
and supplier constraints negatively affect a firm’s economic performance. Moreover, 
in an industry with low bargaining power (i.e., higher customer and supplier 
dependency or constraints), corporate strategies depend more on customers and 
suppliers, which increases the costs of gathering resources and distributing products.  
Theoretical and empirical work on capital structure also has addressed economic 
links to customers and suppliers during financial distress episodes. Regarding 
non-financial stakeholders’ (NFS) bargaining power, Kale and Shahrur (2007) find 
that a firm tends to have higher debt ratios when its customers and suppliers take 
strong bargaining positions. Firms with more debt have more chances to file for 
8 
 
bankruptcy. Yet Sarig (1998) shows that when a firm worries about suppliers 
threatening to curtail its specialized factors of production, it will limit its leverage 
both before and after contracting, to prevent potential NFS hold-up behavior. 
Lowering the debt ratio should reduce the likelihood that unstable supply will lead to 
the firm’s liquidation. However, we find no clear conclusion about the effect of 
suppliers’ bargaining power on firms’ leverage, nor do we have any compelling 
arguments about whether suppliers’ constraints raise the firm’s bankruptcy chances or 
not. 
Customers’ constraints often arise when one specific supplier is closely 
connected to its buyers. The supplier suffers a weaker bargaining power position and 
also suffers more losses when its buyers cannot pay, especially during financial 
distress periods. In a booming economy, a supplier that faces high customer 
constraints earns lower profits; in a bust economy, it cannot collect payments from its 
customers. Thus both forces imply that firms with more customer constraints are more 
likely to file for bankruptcy.  
On the other side, high supplier constraints indicate that the firm has a stronger 
connection to its suppliers. It again takes a weaker bargaining power position but does 
not suffer the same potential monetary losses, because it is the customer, obligated to 
pay its suppliers, not receive payments. Therefore, a firm facing strong suppliers’ 
constraints may not go bankrupt as easily as a firm with high customers’ constraints. 
Thus we formulate our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The stronger a firm’s customers’ constraints, the higher its 
incidence of bankruptcy. The relationship between a firm’s suppliers’ constraints 
and its bankruptcy is unclear. 
We use a measure of external industry constraints proposed by Burt, Guilarte, 
Raider, and Yasuda (2002), which begins with a consideration of resource dependence, 
or the extent to which producers in a market depend on another market to buy or sell, 
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directly or indirectly. They simultaneously consider constraints derived from customer 
and supplier markets. To investigate the impact of customers’ and suppliers’ 
constraints on bankruptcy prediction specifically, and following Shih’s (2007) 
suggestion, we partition Burt et al.’s (2002) combined measure of external industry 
constraints into customers’ constraints and suppliers’ constraints. Burt et al. (2002) 
measure external constraints on industry i as the sum of transaction-specific 
constraints on the market, using the value of commodities sold to industry j from 
industry i. We denote Ci,B and Ci,S as customers’ and suppliers’ constraints, 
respectively, in industry i, then calculate them using the following method:  
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p , , ji  . Moreover, Hj is the concentration ratio of industry j, computed 
by the Herfindahl index; and zij is the dollar worth of the commodities sold to industry 
j from industry i. To provide the intuition underlying this measure, we use customers’ 
constraints as an example: The squared term in Equation (2) is the degree of direct 
and indirect dependence of industry i on market j, measured by pij, or the proportion 
of industry i’s sales that occur directly to market j, plus the proportion of industry i’s 
sales that indirectly involve market j through market q. Then Hj is the extent to which 
the buyer market j is oligopolistic. Finally, Ci,B and Ci,S vary between 0 and 1, and the 
later scenario implies the maximum constraint. A firm in an industry with Ci,B (Ci,S) 
equal to 0 has maximal bargaining power as a supplier (customer). 
3. Data  
For our empirical study, we select all firms traded on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
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and those with available data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and COMPUSTAT databases to construct explanatory variables. To discriminate 
bankrupt firms from non-bankrupt ones, we adopt a broad definition of bankruptcy 
that includes firms delisted due to bankruptcy, liquidation, or poor performance 
(Dichev, 1998; Brockman and Turtle 2003). Bankrupt firms in our sample meet two 
conditions: They were listed in the CRSP database but then were delisted during our 
sample period, and the delisting code reported by CRSP equals 400 or 550–585.2 We 
identify 3392 bankruptcies according to these criteria, more than any other published 
study to the best of our knowledge. 
3.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 depicts bankruptcies as a percentage of active companies per year in our 
sample.3 The general shape of this figure reflects national recessions, as defined by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),4 which has reported three 
recessions since 1983. The early 1990s recession related to the 1990 oil price shock, 
the debt accumulation of the 1980s, new banking regulations following the savings 
and loan crisis, and growing consumer pessimism. In Figure 1, we find a notable peak 
from 1990 to 1992. The second recession, in the early 2000s, combined the collapse 
of the speculative dot-com bubble and the September 11 attacks. Again, in Figure 1, 
we find a relative higher bankruptcy incidence in 2000–2002. The most recent, ―Great 
Recession,‖ runs from December 2007 to June 2009. Although we cannot observe the 
full effects of this last episode after 2008 due to data limitations, we find a big 
increase in bankruptcies in 2008, consistent with economic facts. 
                                                 
2 The Appendix provides definitions of the CRSP delisting codes. 
3 Our sample period starts in 1983, but Figure 1 does not contain the percentage of bankruptcy in 1983, 
because our bankruptcy prediction model relies on one-year ahead data as independent variables. 
Therefore, our actual sample only includes bankruptcy data from 1984. 
4 The NBER defines a recession as ―a significant decline in economic activity spread across the 
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross domestic product (GDP), real 
income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.‖ 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 2 instead segments bankruptcies by stock exchange listing. More than 
80% of the firms in our sample that filed for bankruptcy were listed on NASDAQ. 
The remaining percentage is almost evenly spread between the NYSE and AMEX.5  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
3.2. Description of Input–Output Table  
To measure external industry constraints—namely, customers’ and suppliers’ 
constraints—we use summarized versions of the input–output tables published by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Specifically, the ―Use Table of Input-Output 
Accounts for the U.S. Economy‖ reports a matrix with the values of commodity flows 
between each pair of industries. However, the industry classification in this table 
changed after 1998, from Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) to the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). To be consistent, we divide our 
sample into two periods: 1983–1997 (SIC) and 1998–2008 (NAICS). Also, the table 
was published every five years before 1997, after which annual updates were 
published. For consistency, we thus use data reported in the 1987 ―Benchmark Use 
Table‖ to represent the period 1983–1989, and then use the data in the 1992 
―Benchmark Use Table‖ for the period 1990–1997. After 1998, we use annual data for 
each year through 1998–2008. Although the input–output tables classify the industries 
based on SIC or NAICS codes, we only observe the input–output (IO) industry code 
to classify industries into tables. To group firms in the CRSP database into different 
industries based on IO code, we use an SIC–IO codes conversion table,6 as well as a 
document relating NAICS codes to IO codes.7 Finally, all firms before 1997 are 
                                                 
5 Shumway (2001) considers the NYSE and AMEX, where bankruptcies happen with a much lower 
probability than in the NASDAQ. 
6 The SIC–IO code conversion table is available on Joseph P.H. Fan’s personal website. 
7 This document, available on the BEA website, is ―A Document for 2002 Benchmark Input-Output 
Accounts: Summary Make Table and Use Table before Redefinitions.‖  
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grouped into eight industries; after 1998 they span fourteen industries in our sample 
set.8 
Table 1 contains an overview of bankruptcies by IO codes. According to Panel A, 
before 1997, most bankruptcies occurred in manufacturing (37%) or services (19%). 
As Panel B of Table 1 indicates, after 1998, almost 39% of the total bankruptcies 
happened in the manufacturing sector, followed by the information industry (15%) 
and then finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing, which account for 12% of 
the total bankruptcies registered during this period.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.3. Definition of Independent Variables 
We use a dynamic logit regression method to analyze bankruptcy prediction (see 
Shumway, 2001) with five explanatory variables:  
(1) Excess return (EXRET), or the monthly log excess return on each firm’ stock 
return relative to the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index 
return. Low past excess returns should increase the chance of bankruptcy, 
because the decrease in equity value increases leverage and therefore default 
probabilities. 
(2) Relative size (RSIZ), which is the logarithm of each firm’s market equity 
value (outstanding shares  stock prices) divided by the total 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market equity value. The lower the relative size, the 
higher the default probability, such that we expect a negative relationship 
between RSIZ and bankruptcy likelihood. 
                                                 
8 The initial eight industries were (1) agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; (2) mining; (3) 
construction; (4) manufacturing; (5) transportation, communication and utilities; (6) trade; (7) finance, 
insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing; and (8) services. The fourteen industries instead are specified 
as (1) agriculture, forestry; fishing and hunting; (2) mining; (3) utilities; (4) construction; (5) 
manufacturing; (6) wholesale trade; (7) retail trade; (8) transportation and warehousing; (9) information; 
(10) finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing; (11) professional and business services; (12) 
educational services, health care, and social assistance; (13) arts, entertainment, recreation, 
accommodation, and food services; and (14) other services, except government. 
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(3) Volatility of each firm’s stock returns (SIGMA)—a sample standard deviation 
using the last 60 observable daily returns.9 It measures the probability of the 
firm’s asset values being below the default threshold, so we expect that higher 
SIGMA indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
(4) NI/TA, or the firm’s net income divided by the adjusted total assets (see (5) 
below). This ratio typically represents a firm’s profitability, and we expect a 
negative effect on bankruptcy.  
(5) TL/TA, or the firm’s total liabilities divided by the adjusted total assets. As a 
proxy of leverage, a firm with high TL/TA tends to have high probability of 
bankruptcy. We use adjusted total assets, instead of the raw total assets data 
from COMPUSTAT, to prevent potential errors of measurement in the assets’ 
book values (TA) or generate outliers when used as denominators in 
calculating financial ratios. Thus we adjust the total assets following the 
procedure suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). The adjusted 
total assets are the sum of 10% of the difference between market and book 
equity and the book value of total assets (see Campbell et al., 2008): 
   , , ,, 0.1i t i t i ti tTotal Assets adjusted TA ME BE    (3) 
In addition to standard profitability and leverage variables, liquidity may 
determine bankruptcy. Firms often default because of their inability to pay their 
financial obligations on time due to the imbalance between their cash inflows and 
outflows (see Laitinen and Laitinen, 1998). To the extent that managers 
opportunistically manipulate accruals, earnings (which depend significantly on net 
                                                 
9 The stock’s volatility measure comes from Chava and Jarrow (2004) and differs from the method 
offered by Shumway (2001), who calculates each firm’s sigma for year t by regressing each stock’s 
monthly returns in year t – 1 on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return for the same 
year. Sigma is the standard deviation of the residual of this regression. 
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income) offer a less reliable measure, and cash flow–based variables might be 
preferable.10 Thus we add a measure of liquidity in the form of the ratio of a 
company’s cash and short-term assets to its adjusted total assets (CASH/TA). An 
increasing CASH/TA should indicate a smaller chance of bankruptcy. 
We also include the market-to-book ratio (MB), or the market value of equity 
(ME) divided by book value of equity (BE).11 The book value of equity is as defined 
by Davis, Fama, and French (2000); following Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003), 
we replace negative BE values with small positive values of $1 to ensure that the 
market-to-book ratios are in the right, not the left, tail of the distribution. The MB 
variable captures the relative value of the firm’s equity from stockholders’ and 
accountants’ viewpoint. Firms close to bankruptcy often have suffered eroded book 
value of their equity, driving up their market-to-book ratio; however, the stock market 
often discounts the market value of equity, given traders’ negative predictions about 
those firms, driving down the market-to-book ratio. Thus, though MB has the 
potential to predict bankruptcy, it is unclear how it relates empirically to bankruptcy. 
For the time being, we anticipate that increasing MB results in increasing bankruptcy 
likelihood, in line with empirical evidence from Campbell et al. (2008).  
Finally, to test for the effect of industrial structural constraints, we consider the 
internal industry constraint, measured by our Herfindahl index (H), and external 
industry constraints, including buyers’ (Ci,B) and suppliers’ (Ci,S) constraints, as we 
                                                 
10 Cash flow might be a bankruptcy predictor: ―Many financial analysts regard operating cash flow as 
a better gauge of corporate financial performance than net income, since it is less subject to distortion 
from differing accounting practices‖ (Chemical Week, May 8, 1991, p. 28). 
11 BE is the stockholders’ book equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if 
available), minus the book value of preferred stock. We measure stockholders’ equity as the book value 
of common equity plus the par value of preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total 
liabilities (in that order). 
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reviewed previously.  
3.4. Yearly vs. Quarterly and Monthly Observation Intervals 
Chava and Jarrow (2004) posit that monthly observation intervals can improve 
bankruptcy prediction, compared with yearly frequencies, because more frequent 
accounting reports (quarterly) provide more updated information about the company’s 
financial health. However, considering the potential for earnings management in 
accounting reports, we wonder if quarterly accounting reports may be more accurate. 
That is, companies might manage their earnings to avoid reporting losses or earnings 
decreases or to meet analysts’ expectations at the end of each year.12 Although 
earnings management could be used both quarterly and annually, prior research 
suggests that the extensiveness of such ―massaging‖ of accounting information is far 
greater in quarterly reports, for three main reasons.  
First, a firm can increase its quarterly earnings indirectly through accounting 
methods, such as by increasing accruals, or directly by postponing expenses to future 
quarters (Bernhardt and Campello, 2007). Matsunaga and Park (2001) show that CEO 
bonuses provide managers an incentive to meet the earnings reported for the same 
quarter of the prior year, for example. Second, errors in a previous quarterly report 
must be corrected in the annual report,13 and on average, these error corrections are 
negative, such that original quarterly reported earnings appear overstated (Kinney and 
McDaniel, 1989). Third, accounting regulations do not mandate independent audits of 
quarterly reports, so managers may find it easier to fudge interim quarterly earnings, 
compared with earnings in the fourth quarter. Auditing provides a mechanism for 
ensuring that companies provide accurate information, and auditors should warn 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Hayn (1995); Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
(1999); Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003); and Roychowdhury (2006). 
13 The SEC’s Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 177 mandates that corrections of errors in 
quarterly earnings reports of public firms be uncovered in the annual report. 
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investors if a company appears likely to file for bankruptcy. Thus audited annual 
earnings likely are more credible and accurate than interim quarterly earnings with 
regard to the company’s true financial health.  
Existing literature investigates whether capital market participants may be fooled 
by earnings management; one article suggests that investors cannot see through cases 
of earnings management, and investors may fail to price firms properly to include 
earnings shocks caused by accruals (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 14  In addition, 
evidence indicates that firms that manage to meet or beat their earnings expectations 
enjoy an average quarterly return almost 3% higher than that of peers that fail to do so, 
even if investors discount the return after they notice earnings management practices 
(Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002). One study pays particular attention to the 
comparison of stock performance by firms that issue accurate annual reports and those 
that fudge quarterly reports. Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) document that firms 
that report earnings strings of at least 20 quarters (five years) with consecutive 
non-decreases enjoy abnormal returns of more than 20% per year during the first five 
years, much larger than the returns of firms that report five years of consecutive 
increases in annual (but not quarterly) reports.  
Thus market participants appear to incorrectly value firm performance due to 
earnings management efforts, especially when companies manipulate their quarterly 
reports. The market also incorrectly interprets this accounting information. For a 
bankruptcy model then, market variables may not reflect firms’ true financial situation. 
To conclude that using quarterly accounting data is better than using yearly data thus 
is debatable and open to challenge from empirical evidence.  
Moreover, we cannot confirm if the superiority of monthly data over yearly data, 
                                                 
14 Kinney and McDaniel (1989) show that the market may be misled by misstated quarterly earnings 
reports, based on the significant difference in the price performance of firms with over- versus 
understatements.  
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as suggested by Chava and Jarrow (2004), has persisted.15 To test this effect over 
time, we construct separate yearly and monthly (using quarterly accounting data) 
observation interval data sets, following the procedures by Shumway (2001) and 
Chava and Jarrow (2004).  
For the yearly observation interval, we merge data sets with annual firm-level 
accounting data from COMPUSTAT with monthly and daily equity price data from 
CRSP. A firm contributes an observation for every year after it starts appearing in the 
databases until the end of the sample period or its delisting year. To exploit data 
available in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT, we adjust our sample to contain 18,175 
firms and 143,585 firm-year observations, which includes 3392 bankruptcies 
(according to our broad definition). In constructing the time-series variables, we 
lagged all independent variables one year, to ensure they were observable to the 
market at the beginning of each year. For example, if the dependent variable occurs in 
year t, we based the market information of independent variables on year t – 1, with 
the exception of SIGMA, which we computed as the sample standard deviation using 
the last 60 observable daily returns. The annual excess return (EXRET) is computed 
from the sum of monthly returns minus the value-weighted CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return for the previous year. The relative size (RSIZ) 
is the logarithm of each firm’s market equity value, divided by the weighted average 
of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market equity value at the end of previous year. For the 
accounting variables (NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB), we matched every yearly 
observation (calendar year) from the CRSP database with accounting data about the 
fiscal year, with a one-year lag. We removed any yearly observation with missing 
accounting variables. Similar to previous literature (Chava and Jarrow, 2004), we also 
discard outliers (e.g., typos, reporting errors) and truncate all variables at the 1st and 
                                                 
15 Recall that their sample period is from 1963 to 1998. 
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99th percentiles of their pooled distributions across all firm-year observations. In 
addition, we replace any observation below the 1st percentile with the 1st percentile 
and any observation above the 99th percentile with the 99th percentile. 
When dealing with the monthly observation interval, we still use daily and 
monthly equity price data from CRSP data, but instead of using the annual report in 
COMPUSTAT, we match the most recent previous quarterly accounting data to the 
current month. Thus both the accounting and market data are lagged by a month so 
that they are available to the market at the time of the estimation. The excess return 
(EXRET) is monthly returns minus the value-weighted CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return at the end of the previous month; relative size 
(RSIZ) is the logarithm of each firm’s market equity value divided by the weighted 
average of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market equity value at the end of the previous 
month. SIGMA is the same as in the yearly data set. In line with Chava and Jarrow 
(2004), if the accounting data are not yet available, we use the previous quarter’s 
accounting data.  
However, unlike Chava and Jarrow (2004), we do not substitute a previously 
available observation for missing accounting or market data. When market or 
accounting data are missing for a given firm, it might indicate that the company in 
question prefers not to disclose the information or is unable to estimate certain items 
because of its poor financial situation, in which case the database institutions cannot 
report the information.16 If we were to use previously available data to replace these 
missing values, it might bias our analysis; instead, we conservatively discard the 
observations with missing values17 and thus ensure that the accounting data are 
                                                 
16 In a credit card scoring context, Foster and Stine (2004) suggest that missing values are informative 
for assessing customer risks.  
17 For example, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 
September 15, 2008, the fourth quarter in that year. From our monthly observation sample set, in the 
third quarter of that year, two important accounting variables were missing: (1) cash and short-term 
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available at the beginning of the month. The final sample contains approximately 1.7 
million firm-month observations and 2957 bankruptcies. The fewer bankruptcies in 
this observation data set, compared with the yearly set, results because we find more 
missing data in the quarterly accounting reports. To limit the influence of outliers 
even further, we winsorize all our explanatory variables using a 5th/95th percentile 
interval (as suggested by Campbell et al., 2008).  
We report summary statistics for our 10 main explanatory variables for both 
firm-yearly and firm-monthly observations in Panels A and B of Table 2, respectively. 
The average value of EXRET is −7.33% per year (Panel A) and –1.36% per month 
(see Panel B), which reflects the underperformance of stocks during our sample 
period. Individual stock returns are extremely volatile; the average value of the 
annualized firm-level volatility (SIGMA) is 63% and 56% for the yearly and monthly 
data sets, respectively. The net income relative to adjusted total asset (NI/TA) is 
negative in both data sets, which indicates that firms had no profits during this period. 
Furthermore, the proportion of the total liability to adjusted total assets is 
approximately 50% for both data sets. That is, firms tend to match their liabilities with 
their equity.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The summary statistics for bankrupt firms’ yearly and monthly observations 
appear separately in Panels A and B of Table 3. This table indicates the characteristics 
of bankrupt firms one year and one month prior to their bankruptcy, which provides a 
hint about which interval predicts bankruptcy more accurately. Intuition tells us that if 
firms are about to file for bankruptcy, they should have low excess returns (EXRET), 
smaller relative firm size (RSIZ), larger volatility (SIGMA), low NI/TA, large TL/TA, 
                                                                                                                                            
investments and (2) total liability. These missing data might have revealed the firm’s financial distress, 
but databases could not record that information. We thus remove Lehman Brothers from our quarterly 
observation data set.  
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low CASH/TA, and large MB, compared with the summary statistics for all 
observations in Table 2.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
We find just these trends, for both yearly and monthly data. It is reasonable that firms 
about to go bankrupt have less net income, but they also might temporarily raise their 
net income reports by recognizing lower expenses to prevent investors from 
perceiving their financial distress. This strategy may bias bankruptcy predictions. In 
Table 3, the average NI/TA among bankrupt firm-year observations is –0.321, while 
the average for bankrupt firm-quarter observations, multiplied by 4, is 
around –0.232.18 Firms appear to try to make their net income look better in the 
quarterly report, whereas the annual report provides more realistic accounting 
information. In turn, we expect that the data set with yearly observation intervals is 
more likely to provide greater explanatory power for bankruptcy models.  
4. Bankruptcy Prediction Model 
Following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. 
(2008), we use a simple hazard model to estimate the probabilities of bankruptcy over 
the next period in a dynamic logit model. The main advantage of a simple hazard 
model is that we can control for and adjust the firm’s at-risk period. For longer 
sampling periods, it is important to acknowledge that some firms file for bankruptcy 
after many years of being at risk, whereas other firms fail in their first risky year. Our 
model incorporates time-varying covariates that change over time; if a firm’s financial 
health deteriorates before bankruptcy, its financial data reveal its changing health over 
time. 
We assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy in the next period follows 
                                                 
18 The sum of four quarterly net income values equals annual net income, so to compare annual NI/TA 
and quarterly NI/TA, we must multiple quarterly NI/TA by 4 to approximate annual NI/TA.  
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a logistic distribution, expressed as: 
 1
, 1
1
1
1 exp( )t it i t
P Y
x  
 
  
, (4) 
with the parameters ( , )   and time-varying covariates , 1i tx   
for the discrete time 
hazard rate. The dependent variable itY  equals 1 if the year observation with a 
delisting code belongs to our broad definition of bankruptcy, or 0 otherwise. A similar 
application for monthly data is itY , an indicator that equals 1 if the firms go bankrupt 
in month t. In addition, , 1i tx   is a vector of explanatory variables known at the end of 
the previous month. To measure the explanatory power of a simple hazard model, we 
report McFadden’s pseudo-R2 coefficient, calculated as 1 − L1/L0, where L1 is the 
log-likelihood of the estimated model and L0 is the log-likelihood of a null model that 
includes only a constant term. This hazard model is equivalent to a discrete time logit 
model with corrections in the estimation of the parameter’s standard errors. 
4.1. Bankruptcy Prediction with Industry Constraints  
To provide empirical evidence regarding how industry constraints relate to 
bankruptcy, we estimate a dynamic logit model with five standard variables (EXRET, 
RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, and TL/TA), two extra variables (CASH/TA and MB), and 
three industry constraint variables (H, Ci,B, and Ci,S) as regressors. We implement the 
dynamic logit model for both yearly and monthly observation intervals to learn 
whether a shorter interval data set can improve bankruptcy predictions. The yearly 
and monthly estimation results for firms traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
during 1983–2008 appear in Panels A and B of Table 4.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.1.1. Yearly observation interval data set 
In Panel A of Table 4, we note first that for market-driven variables (EXRET, 
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RSIZ, and SIGMA), and in agreement with prior findings, excess return and relative 
size relate negatively to bankruptcy predictions, whereas volatility has a positive 
impact. They are all statistically significant at the 1% level.19 The signs of these 
coefficients are consistent with simple economic intuition; for example, smaller firms 
tend to use more short-term debt than larger firms, which make them riskier and more 
prone to financial distress and eventual bankruptcy. A firm with higher volatility bears 
more risk and thereby increases the possibilities of bankruptcy. For NI/TA and TL/TA 
though, our results are not consistent with Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) claims that 
NI/TA is not significant when market-driven variables appear in the bankruptcy 
model. In regressions of our more recent data, accounting-driven variables relate 
significantly to bankruptcy, even if market variables already appear in the model. 
Both variables enter significantly and with the expected sign: Decreasing NI/TA 
(measure of firm profitability) and increasing TL/TA (measure of firm leverage) tend 
to increase chances of bankruptcy. 
We next turn to the two added explanatory variables with accounting information. 
We observe CASH/TA is significantly and negatively related to bankruptcy across all 
models, which agrees with our expected intuition that a firm is more likely to go 
bankrupt when it cannot pay its creditors under liquidity limitations. Furthermore, MB 
meets our expectation; it shows a significantly positive sign in all models in Panel A 
of Table 4: The probability of bankruptcy increases when the market value is 
unusually high relative to the book value. 
Table 4 also reveals how internal or external industry constraints can explain 
bankruptcies, beyond market-driven variables or accounting ratios. In Panel A, the 
Herfindahl index is significantly positive for bankruptcies in columns 1 and 4, which 
                                                 
19 In our test, significance is less than 5% or 1% if the value of z-statistics is greater than 1.645 or 2.33, 
respectively.  
23 
 
is consistent with our first hypothesis, namely, that a higher concentration ratio (lower 
industry internal constraint) leads to a higher incidence of firm bankruptcy. Firms in 
highly concentrated industries are more likely to file for bankruptcy, even after we 
control for other market and accounting variables.  
We also study the relationship between external industry constraints and 
bankruptcy prediction; according to Panel A of Table 4, in the first regression result 
(full model) and Model (3), the customer constraint (Ci,B) coefficient is positive and 
significant, in support of our second hypothesis. That is, the stronger customers’ 
constraints, the higher the incidence of firm bankruptcy. Finally, the estimated 
coefficient for supplier constraints (Ci,S) is not significant in the full model but is 
negative and significant in Model (3), from which we removed the H variable. Thus 
the relationship between suppliers’ constraints and bankruptcy remains unclear.  
In summary, according to our yearly estimation results, we can not only 
reconfirm the effect of previously used bankruptcy variables but also provide 
empirical evidence in support of our two hypotheses.  
4.1.2. Monthly observation interval data set 
Following a similar procedure, we report the monthly estimation results in Panel 
B of Table 4. In general, these results are similar to our yearly outcomes, except that 
we find the CASH/TA variable is insignificant though still negative.  
The value of the pseudo-R2 based on yearly data also is 25% larger than that based on 
monthly data: 0.34 (last row, Panel A) compared with 0.27 (last row, Panel B), across 
all models in Table 4. Unlike Chava and Jarrow (2004), we find that the in-sample 
explanatory power of the bankruptcy prediction model based on yearly data is greater 
than that based on monthly data, perhaps because quarterly accounting reports do not 
deliver more accurate information pertaining to bankruptcy likelihood. Furthermore, 
more recent market information may incorrectly reflect firms’ actual situation before 
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bankruptcies.  
4.2. Robustness Tests: Yearly vs. Quarterly Data  
4.2.1. In-sample performance 
For a more robust comparison of in-sample performance, we recomputed the 
pseudo-R2 for the years 1984–2008 by implementing the dynamic logit model with 
five standard variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, and TL/TA). As Table 5 
shows, the pseudo-R2 from the yearly data is greater than that derived from monthly 
data for every year except 2004, 2006, and 2007. Both 2006 and 2007, just before the 
recent Great Recession, contain the lowest percentage of bankruptcies over our 
sample, according to Figure 1. Thus monthly data may perform slightly better than 
yearly data for predicting bankruptcies just before recessions. However, the advantage 
of yearly interval data remains pervasive, especially in 2003, one year after dot-com 
recession, and 1991–1994, covering two years of the 1990s recession and the next two 
years. We lack empirical results after 2008, but we maintain that yearly data are more 
useful than monthly data in normal times but especially in the years after recessions. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Overall, the estimated coefficients are significant and with appropriate signs for 
both yearly and monthly data, except for CASH/TA, which becomes insignificant in 
the monthly data. The information from the past year seems more useful for 
predicting bankruptcies than information from the past month. Therefore, we use 
yearly data in our bankruptcy prediction model to determine how industry factors 
might explain bankruptcies.  
4.2.2. Out-of-sample performance 
To compare the out-of-sample performance of estimates from bankruptcy 
prediction models, we also analyze how well they forecast bankruptcy events before 
they appear, using only past available information. Specifically, we use the area under 
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the Receiver Operating Character (ROC) curve to assess prediction accuracy. This 
popular technique for validating internal credit rating models relies on the Area Under 
the ROC Curve (AUC) to indicate the quality of a rating model (Sobehart and Keenan, 
2001). By construction, the model has no predictive power if the value of area under 
the ROC curve is 0.5 and demonstrates perfect forecasting ability if the value is 1.0. 
To compute the ROC measure, we estimate the model using 1983–1999 data and 
reserve the last nine years (2000–2008) as the out-of-sample period.20 We use all 
available data before the out-of-sample period to estimate the parameters of each 
model, and then use the estimated parameters to forecast bankruptcy probabilities in 
2000–2008 for each model. Finally, to calculate the AUC, we use forecasted 
bankruptcy probabilities and their corresponding observed status for each observation 
during the out-of-sample period. 
Our aim is to investigate whether yearly interval data have better forecasting 
ability than monthly interval data, as we found for in-sample performance, so we 
implement the same model (logit regression, five variables). In addition, it is 
worthwhile to compare the yearly out-of-sample performance on market-driven (logit 
regression with EXRET, RSIZ, and SIGMA) and accounting-driven (logit regression 
with NI/TA and TL/TA) variable models against their monthly out-of-sample 
performance. The empirical AUC results appear in Table 6.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
In terms of the yearly interval, the AUC for the recent sample period with 
Shumway’s model and the accounting-driven model is 0.885 and 0.79, 
respectively—greater than the AUC values reported by Chava and Jarrow (2004), that 
is, 0.868 and 0.723, respectively. The relatively larger difference in the 
                                                 
20 Chava and Jarrow (2004) forecast bankruptcy probabilities of observations over an out-of-sample 
period of 1991–1999. 
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accounting-driven variable model may reflect two main influences. First, our sample 
is more recent. Second, we remove observations with missing previous year 
accounting data to avoid potential bias. Furthermore, the results in Table 6 indicate 
that the AUCs in yearly interval observations are greater than those in monthly data 
across all three models, consistent with our in-sample analysis. Therefore, we confirm 
that using yearly data is better than monthly data for both in-sample explanatory 
power and out-of-sample forecasting ability. Finally, we find that the AUC in the 
monthly, market-driven variable model (0.846) is higher than in Shumway’s model 
(0.806). The performance differential reflects that addition of two more accounting 
variables; that is, additional quarterly accounting information cannot raise forecasting 
abilities and even might provide incorrect information. This result supports our 
previous supposition that earnings management efforts in quarterly accounting reports 
bias predictions of bankrupt events. In summary, with yearly data, the best model (in- 
and out-of-sample) includes both accounting and market-based variables. However, 
when we use monthly market data and quarterly accounting reports, the best model 
only features market data. 
5. Bankruptcy Models Within and Across Industries  
With industry-level measures (H, Ci,B, and Ci,S), we have connected bankruptcies 
to industry effects, including competition and bargaining power. In addition to firms’ 
characteristics, greater internal concentration in an industry and less external 
bargaining power compared with other industries increase the possibilities of 
bankruptcy. To further this investigation, we next split the information related to our 
seven main firm-level variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, 
and MB) into within- and across-industry components. No previous research has 
outlined this relationship, though some studies tend to indicate that differences in firm 
characteristics are more important predictors of expected returns than are 
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industry-level variables. For example, Asness, Porter, and Stevens (2000) decompose 
book-to-market ratios into within- and across-industry components and find that the 
value effect is primarily within-industry, and Lewellen (1999) shows that a 
book-to-market factor explains common variation in returns unrelated to industry. 
We adopt Asness et al.’s (2000) methodology to separate our market-wide 
independent variable 21  into two components: (1) the difference between firms’ 
characteristics and the average characteristics of their industries (within-industry 
variables) and (2) the average characteristics of firms’ industries (across-industry 
variables). This within- versus across-industry decomposition allows variables 
relative to their industry averages to reduce measurement error. For example, 
differences in accounting practices across industries can lead to differences in a 
variable that are unrelated to the incidence of bankruptcy. 
The formal model is as follows: We regard itX  (market-wide variable) as any 
variable in our original logit model, but IitX  (across-industry effect) denotes the 
average value of variable X over all firms located in a specific industry I. Then 
( )it IitX X  is the deviation between the firm and its industry mean, or the 
within-industry effect. Our bankruptcy prediction model thus replaces any original 
explanatory variable by ( )it IitX X  and IitX , so our new prediction relies on within- 
and across-industry independent variables related to EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, 
TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB.  
5.1. Bankruptcy Prediction Based on Within- and Across-Industry Variables 
Table 7 contains the logit model results for various specifications of the within- 
and across-industry variables. We consider three logit regressions for 1983–2008: 
                                                 
21 Our market-wide independent variable includes three market-driven variables (EXRET, RSIZ, and 
SIGMA) and four accounting-driven variables (NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB).  
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Column 1 estimates a regression on all within- and across-industry variables, Column 
2 contains the regression for only within-industry variables, and Column 3 estimates 
the regression with only across-industry variables. The notations (W) and (A) in Table 
7 refer to within- and across-industry variables, respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
In Column 1, almost all within- and across-industry variables enter significantly 
and with a sign consistent with the market-wide variable in Panel A of Table 4. The 
first exception is that EXRET(A) and TL/TA(A) become insignificant, though still 
consistent with the expected sign. In contrast, MB(A) switches signs and is 
statistically significant. These results imply that the economic intuition perfectly fits 
the intra-industry scenario, but variation on industry-level characteristics sometimes 
cannot predict bankruptcy. In Column 2, all variables demonstrate the expected sign 
and are highly statistically significant, which reconfirms that a firm’s characteristics, 
relative to its industry, are useful for gauging the incidence of bankruptcy. Not 
surprisingly, Column 3 shows that EXRET(A) becomes insignificant, and both 
TL/TA(A) and MB(A) become negatively significant, in contrast with our economic 
intuition. Moreover, we note that the value of pseudo-R2 in the within-industry model 
is 0.33, but it is only 0.02 in the across-industry model. Thus it appears that 
bankruptcy prediction ability stems mainly from the variation of a firm’s 
characteristics relative to its located industry, and industrial characteristics have very 
minor impact on bankruptcy predictions. 
5.2. Out-of-Sample Performance 
In Table 8 we compare AUC computed from predicted probabilities across all 
out-of-sample periods. According to Figure 1, there are five kinds of out-of-sample 
periods, based on three recessions (1990–1992, 2000–2002, and 2008) and two 
relatively stable periods between each pair of recessions (1993–1999 and 2003–2007). 
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For each out-of-sample period, we estimate each model with seven years of data 
before the predicted year.22 The model notation is as follows: Model (1) is the logit 
regression on our main explanatory variables except for the industry constraint 
variables (EXERT, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB); W-and-A 
refers to the logit regression with all within- and across-industry variables; W is the 
logit regression with only within-industry variables; and A is the logit regression using 
only across-industry variables.  
To compare forecasting abilities with respect to characteristics within and across 
industries, we also report the ratios of the AUC of the within-industry model to that of 
Model (1) (W/Model(1)) and of the AUC of the across-industry model to that of 
Model (1) (A/Model(1)). The AUC based on the W model is almost the same as that 
in Model (1), and the ratio is approximately 99% for all periods. This finding 
reinforces the extremely high explanatory power for the within-industry variables. Yet 
the ratio of AUC on A relative to Model (1) ranges from 59% to 69%; that is, 
across-industry effects provide a poor ability to predict the incidence of bankruptcy.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
6. Conclusion 
We have examined two issues with this research: the effects of the degrees of 
competition and connection with customers and suppliers in a given industry on 
bankruptcy predictions and the relative performance of market-driven and accounting 
variables in terms of forecasting bankruptcy, as well as potential distortions in 
accounting information over time. Accordingly, we have proposed and tested two 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that greater concentration ratios lead to a 
higher incidence of bankruptcy for firms in that industry. We also predict that stronger 
                                                 
22 We choose seven years as the in-sample length in accordance with our available in-sample data 
period for the first out-of-sample period, or 1983–1989.  
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customer constraints increase the incidence rates of bankruptcy, because these firms 
are more vulnerable to adverse economic conditions. We test and find support for both 
hypotheses. We also find that almost all the strength in bankruptcy predictions stems 
from the variation of the firm’s characteristics relative to its industry, whereas 
industry-specific characteristics have a negligible impact on the accuracy of 
bankruptcy predictions. 
Moreover, we find that models based on yearly data offer 25% more explanatory 
power, on average, than the models based on monthly data. When using yearly data, 
the best model (both in- and out-of-sample) integrates accounting and market-based 
variables; that is, both sources contain relevant information about bankruptcy 
likelihoods over time. However, when we use monthly market data and quarterly 
accounting reports, the best model only includes market data. These findings thus 
raise some challenging questions for ongoing research. In particular, the better 
forecasting performance of the accounting variables measured in yearly intervals, 
compared with quarterly intervals, may imply the potential existence of distortions in 
accounting signals at the quarterly level. The accounting variables might be distorted 
by shortcomings in the accounting conventions being applied, or because managers 
use excessive flexibility when reporting their accounting reports. But an alternative 
explanation is based on the relative efficiency of market prices in reflecting all 
publicly available information regarding bankruptcy because for monthly data, market 
variables are updated more quickly than are the quarterly accounting variables. For 
yearly data, updating of both market and accounting variables occurs at the same 
frequency. Further research should explore ways to disentangle the relative 
importance of the two explanations in yearly and quarterly data. 
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YEAR 
# of bankrupt 
firms 
# of active 
firms 
% of bankrupt to 
active firms YEAR 
# of bankrupt 
firms 
# of active 
firms 
% of bankrupt to 
active firms 
1984 61 4233 1.44% 1997 148 7349 2.01%
1985 84 4327 1.94% 1998 246 7279 3.38%
1986 135 4530 2.98% 1999 194 6889 2.82%
1987 90 4742 1.90% 2000 220 6922 3.18%
1988 122 4919 2.48% 2001 180 5962 3.02%
1989 134 4922 2.72% 2002 253 6023 4.20%
1990 138 4870 2.83% 2003 153 5475 2.79%
1991 140 4602 3.04% 2004 91 5602 1.62%
1992 237 4894 4.84% 2005 113 5530 2.04%
1993 87 5226 1.66% 2006 45 5509 0.82%
1994 121 6321 1.91% 2007 52 5442 0.96%
1995 113 6641 1.70% 2008 130 5072 2.56%
1996 105 6912 1.52%
Figure 1. Bankruptcy by Year. Bankrupt firms must satisfy two conditions: (1) Firms have been listed 
publicly in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchange during 1984–2008 and (2) their reported 
delisting code in CRSP is 400 or 550–585. The 3392 bankruptcies in our sample are separated by year 
in this table, along with bankruptcies as a percentages of active number of firms in that year. 
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Figure 2. Bankruptcy by Exchange. Bankrupt firms must satisfy two conditions: (1) Firms have been 
listed publicly in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchange during 1984–2008 and (2) their reported 
delisting code in CRSP is 400 or 550–585. The 3392 bankruptcies in our sample are separated by 
exchange in this table, along with the percentages of the total number of bankruptcies in brackets. 
Table 1. Bankruptcy by IO Code. Bankrupt firms must satisfy three conditions: (1) Firms have been listed publicly in the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchange during 
1984 to 2008; (2) their reported delisting code in CRSP is 400 or 550–585; and (3) this SIC code mirrors an IO code in the conversion table. The 3392 bankruptcies in our 
sample are listed by IO code, along with the percentages of the total number of bankruptcies. The industry classification system changed after 1998, so there are only eight 
industries before 1997 and fourteen industries after 1998. Panel A reports the number of bankruptcies from 1984 to 1997, and Panel B refers to 1998–2008. 
Panel A: Bankruptcies from 1984 to 1997 
IOCODE INDUSTRY NAME # OF BANKRUPT FIRMS % OF BANKRUPT FIRMS 
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 19 1.11% 
2 Mining 197 11.49% 
3 Construction 49 2.86% 
4 Manufacturing 645 37.61% 
5 Transportation, communication and utilities 82 4.78% 
6 Trade 207 12.07% 
7 Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 190 11.08% 
8 Services 326 19.01% 
 Total 1715 100.00% 
Panel B: Bankruptcies from 1998 to 2008 
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 5 0.30% 
2 Mining 63 3.76% 
3 Utilities 9 0.54% 
4 Construction 43 2.56% 
5 Manufacturing  665 39.65% 
6 Wholesale trade 77 4.59% 
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7 Retail trade 69 4.11% 
8 Transportation and warehousing  45 2.68% 
9 Information 253 15.09% 
10 Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 204 12.16% 
11 Professional and business services 141 8.41% 
12 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 27 1.61% 
13 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 67 4.00% 
14 Other services, except government 9 0.54% 
 Total 1677 100.00% 
Table 2. Summary Statistics: All Firms. This table offers summary statistics (annual and monthly) of 
the independent variables for the sample period 1983–2008. The sample has relevant information in 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP and firms listed on all the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ) are considered. There are 18,175 firms and 143,585 observations in the yearly sample and 
18,951 firms and 1,761,849 observations in the monthly sample. Each firm year and firm month is 
considered a separate observation for the yearly and monthly samples. The variable definitions are: (1) 
EXRET = excess annual return over the value-weighted NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ return; (2) RSIZ 
= relative size, measured as the log of the firm’s market capitalization divided by total NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ market cap; (3) SIGMA = standard deviation computed by using the last sixty observable 
daily returns; (4) NI/TA = net income/adjusted total assets; (5) TL/TA = total liabilities/adjusted total 
assets; (6) CASH/TA = ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets to its adjusted total assets; (7) 
MB = market-to-book ratio; (8) H = Herfindahl index; (9) Ci,B = buyer constraint; and (10) Ci,S = 
supplier constraint. Panels A and B refer to all firm-year observations and all firm-month observations, 
respectively. 
Variable Median Mean Min Max Std 
Panel A: Firm-year observations, 1983 to 2008 
EXRET  -0.0085 -0.0733 -2.2218 1.0297 0.5164 
RSIZ  -11.0844 -10.9744 -15.2721 -5.9389 2.0269 
SIGMA 0.4793 0.6393 0.0827 2.8983 0.5128 
NI/TA 0.0226 -0.0206 -0.9704 0.2348 0.1802 
TL/TA 0.5118 0.5123 0.0261 1.1543 0.268 
CASH/TA 0.0690 0.1415 0.0001 0.7660 0.1720 
MB 1.6072 3.0628 0.0287 45.6008 5.4033 
H 0.0139 0.0229 0.0079 0.2996 0.0238 
Ci,B 0.0192 0.0190 0.0095 0.0454 0.0043 
Ci,S 0.0202 0.0204 0.0079 0.0356 0.0059 
Panel B: Firm-month observations, 1983 to 2008 
EXRET  -0.0109 -0.0136 -0.2653 0.2237 0.1199 
RSIZ  -11.0928 -10.9779 -14.1191 -7.3451 1.8875 
SIGMA 0.4592 0.5607 0.1657 1.4332 0.3476 
NI/TA 0.0054 -0.0040 -0.1175 0.0399 0.038 
TL/TA 0.5066 0.5052 0.086 0.9299 0.2583 
CASH/TA 0.0633 0.1334 0.0025 0.5449 0.1567 
MB 1.6432 2.5105 0.3756 9.7558 2.3811 
H 0.0161 0.0281 0.0090 0.4208 0.0314 
Ci,B 0.0201 0.0220 0.0089 0.0771 0.0082 
Ci,S 0.0238 0.0239 0.0077 0.0548 0.0091 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Bankrupt Firms. This table offers summary statistics (annual and 
monthly) of the independent variables for the sample period 1983–2008. There are 3392 and 2957 
bankruptcies with relevant information in COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the yearly and monthly data 
sets, respectively, and firms listed on all the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) are 
considered. Each firm year is considered a separate observation. The variable definitions are: (1) 
EXRET = excess annual return over the value-weighted NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ return; (2) RSIZ 
= relative size, measured as the log of the firm’s market capitalization divided by total NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ market cap; (3) SIGMA = standard deviation computed by using the last sixty observable 
daily returns; (4) NI/TA = net income/adjusted total assets; (5) TL/TA = total liabilities/adjusted total 
assets; (6) CASH/TA = ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets to its adjusted total assets; and 
(7) MB = market-to-book ratio. Panels A and B refer to bankrupt firm-year observations and bankrupt 
firm-month observations, respectively. 
Variable EXRET  RSIZ  SIGMA NI/TA TL/TA CASH/TA MB 
Panel A: Bankrupt firm-year observations, 1983 to 2008 
Median -0.288 -13.653 1.447 -0.202 0.682 0.055 1.466 
Mean -0.434 -13.505 1.515 -0.321 0.658 0.130 5.130 
Std 0.815 1.373 0.86 0.348 0.312 0.175 9.537 
Panel B: Bankrupt firm-month observations, 1983 to 2008 
Median -0.112 -14.119 1.433 -0.057 0.779 0.042 1.015 
Mean -0.089 -13.695 1.159 -0.058 0.686 0.113 2.457 
Std 0.172 0.798 0.403 0.053 0.267 0.154 3.001 
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Table 4. Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicators on Predictor Variables. For the hazard model 
proposed by Shumway (2001), the estimates include firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
with yearly observations from 1983 to 2008, a total of 143,585 yearly observations of 18,175 firms. 
The model includes five explanatory variables suggested by Shumway (2001): EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, 
NI/TA, and TL/TA. In addition, it features CASH/TA and MB, as well as three independent variables 
for industry constraints (H, Ci,B, and Ci,S). Parameter estimates are given first, followed by the absolute 
value of z-statistics reported in parentheses. *Significant at 5%. **Significant at 1%. The McFadden 
R-square is in the final row. 
 Full Model Shumway's Model Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: All firm-year observations, 1983 to 2008 
Intercept -14.32 -13.77 -14.01 -14.13 -14.14 
 (63.49)** (70.05)** (67.33)** (67.71)** (62.98)** 
EXRET -0.18 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 
 (6.73)** (5.72)** (6.79)** (6.77)** (6.57)** 
RSIZ -0.65 -0.63 -0.65 -0.65 -0.66 
 (42.48)** (42.28)** (42.67)** (42.40)** (42.56)** 
SIGMA 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 
 (36.16)** (36.96)** (36.39)** (36.13)** (36.28)** 
NI/TA -1.95 -2.08 -1.95 -1.95 -1.95 
 (29.13)** (34.38)** (29.06)** (29.09)** (29.06)** 
TL/TA 1.74 1.87 1.70 1.74 1.72 
 (23.29)** (27.97)** (22.99)** (23.47)** (23.02)** 
CASH/TA -0.53  -0.63 -0.54 -0.59 
 (4.13)**  (4.92)** (4.26)** (4.56)** 
MB 0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (11.39)**  (11.08)** (11.34)** (11.04)** 
H 5.49   5.56  
 (8.08)**   (8.51)**  
Ci,B 13.32    18.07 
 (2.44)**    (3.27)** 
Ci,S -4.04    -12.68 
 (0.98)    (3.12)** 
Pseudo-R2 0.344 0.338 0.342 0.344 0.342 
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Panel B: All firm-month observations, 1983 to 2008 
 Full Model Shumway's Model Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept -25.35  -25.08  -25.26  -25.29  -25.32  
 (62.14)**  (64.23)**  (62.58)**  (62.67)**  (62.06)**  
EXRET -0.98  -0.96  -0.98  -0.98  -0.98  
 (8.32)**  (8.19)**  (8.36)**  (8.35)**  (8.32)**  
RSIZ -1.24  -1.23  -1.24  -1.24  -1.24  
 (40.88)**  (41.19)**  (40.86)**  (40.81)**  (40.81)**  
SIGMA 1.44  1.44  1.44  1.44  1.44  
 (24.72)**  (24.79)**  (24.81)**  (24.74)**  (24.79)**  
NI/TA -8.31  -8.53  -8.31  -8.31  -8.31  
 (20.89)**  (22.83)**  (20.88)**  (20.89)**  (20.88)**  
TL/TA 2.41  2.46  2.40  2.41  2.41  
 (28.50)**  (32.12)**  (28.45)**  (28.54)**  (28.40)**  
CASH/TA -0.13   -0.19  -0.16  -0.16  
 (0.95)   (1.36)  (1.13)  (1.11)  
MB 0.02   0.02  0.02  0.02  
 (3.02)**   (3.03)**  (3.06)**  (2.97)**  
H 1.50    1.65   
 (2.85)**    (3.17)**   
Ci,B 6.53     7.69  
 (2.06)*     (2.45)**  
Ci,S -4.93     -5.93  
 (1.76)     (2.12)*  
Pseudo-R2 0.278  0.277  0.278  0.278  0.278  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Pseudo-R2 in Yearly and Monthly Data. This table reports McFadden’s 
pseudo-R2 obtained from the logit model with five standard variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, 
and TL/TA) for each year through 1984 to 2008. McFadden’s pseudo-R2 coefficient is calculated as 1 − 
L1/L0, where L1 is the log-likelihood of the estimated model and L0 is the log-likelihood of a null model 
that includes only a constant term. 
YEAR Yearly-R2 Monthly-R2 YEAR Yearly-R2 Monthly-R2 
1984 0.3272 0.2452 1997 0.4466 0.3213 
1985 0.3277 0.2672 1998 0.4078 0.3297 
1986 0.4106 0.3232 1999 0.3408 0.3192 
1987 0.3363 0.3183 2000 0.3237 0.2925 
1988 0.3090 0.2399 2001 0.3262 0.2712 
1989 0.2507 0.2413 2002 0.3527 0.2960 
1990 0.3737 0.2803 2003 0.4456 0.2852 
1991 0.3644 0.2356 2004 0.3042 0.3130 
1992 0.4032 0.2896 2005 0.3212 0.2459 
1993 0.4028 0.2931 2006 0.1649 0.1956 
1994 0.4193 0.3076 2007 0.2574 0.3571 
1995 0.4121 0.3060 2008 0.2800 0.2731 
1996 0.4321 0.3294    
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Forecasting Accuracy, 2000–2008, by AUC. The dynamic logit model is estimated with data 
from 1983–1999 with yearly and monthly observation intervals to forecast bankruptcy probabilities for 
2000–2008. This table reports the area under the ROC curve (AUC) obtained from the Shumway’s 
model, the market-driven variable model, and the accounting-driven variable model. The AUC is 
calculated using forecasted bankruptcy probabilities and their corresponding observed status for each 
observation over the out-of-sample period. We provide AUC results based on yearly and monthly 
interval observation in the first and second rows, respectively.  
 Shumway’s model Market-driven model Accounting-driven model 
AUC 
Yearly 0.885 0.878 0.790 
Monthly 0.806 0.846 0.693 
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Table 7. Bankruptcy Indicators, Within- and Across-Industry Variables. The hazard model 
proposed by Shumway (2001) is used for within- and across-industry variables. The model is estimated 
for firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with yearly observations from 1983 to 2008, for 
a total of 143,585 yearly observations of 18,175 firms. The model includes five explanatory variables 
suggested by Shumway (2001), EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, and TL/TA, as well as CASH/TA, 
MB, and the three industry constraint variables: H, Ci,B, and Ci,S. Except for industry constraint 
variables, each explanatory variable ( iX ) is decomposed into a within-industry variable, denoted as 
( )i IiX X , and an across-industry variable ( IX ). The notations W and A stand for within-industry and 
across-industry variables, respectively. We consider three logit regressions. (1) Within and Across: the 
regression includes all within- and across-industry variables; (2) Within: the regression includes only 
within-industry variables; and (3) Across: the regression includes only across-industry variables. 
Parameter estimates are given first, followed by the absolute value of the z-statistics reported in 
parentheses. *Significant at 5%. **Significant at 1%. The McFadden R-square is in the final row. 
Variable  Within and Across Within Across 
Intercept -12.26 -5.20 -8.92 
 (20.64)** (132.31)** (17.02)** 
EXRET (W) -0.17 -0.16  
 (6.27)** (5.98)**  
EXRET (A) -0.24  -0.01 
 (1.84)  (0.11) 
RSIZ (W) -0.65 -0.61  
 (41.31)** (40.19)**  
RSIZ (A) -0.63  -0.51 
 (12.80)**  (11.54)** 
SIGMA (W) 0.95 1.01  
 (35.00)** (37.42)**  
SIGMA (A) 0.66  0.79 
 (5.67)**  (7.91)** 
NI/TA (W) -1.88 -1.95  
 (26.88)** (28.31)**  
NI/TA (A) -4.02  -5.27 
 (5.88)**  (9.16)** 
TL/TA (W) 1.79 1.81  
 (23.19)** (23.54)**  
TL/TA (A) 0.19  -0.88 
 (0.71)  (3.81)** 
CASH/TA (W) -0.47 -0.54  
 (3.59)** (4.15)**  
CASH/TA (A) -2.67  -2.75 
 (3.96)**  (4.61)** 
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MB (W) 0.03 0.02  
 (11.42)** (9.87)**  
MB (A) -0.08  -0.08 
 (2.60)**  (2.85)** 
Pseudo-R2 0.34 0.33 0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Out-of-Sample Performance, Within- and Across-Industry Predictors. This table 
compares out-of-sample performance to within- and across-industry predictors by measuring 
forecasting accuracy. An ROC curve is constructed from the predicted probabilities computed for the 
out-of-sample period. The five kinds of out-of-sample periods reflect three recessions (1990–1992, 
2000–2002, and 2008) and two relatively stable periods (1993–1999 and 2003–2007). For each 
out-of-sample period, each model is estimated with seven years of data before the predicted year. 
Model(1) is the logit regression on our main explanatory variables except for industry constraint 
variables (EXERT, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB); W-and-A is the logit 
regression on all within- and across-industry variables; W is the logit regression on only 
within-industry variables; and A is the logit regression on only across-industry variables. Moreover, to 
compare the forecasting abilities with respect to factors within and across industries, we report the ratio 
of the AUCs in the within-industry model to Model(1) (W/Model(1)) and in the across-industry model 
to Model(1) (A/Model(1)). 
 Model(1) W-and-A W A W/Model(1) A/Model(1) 
Out-of-Sample Period AUC 
1990-1992 0.934 0.933 0.923 0.585 98.82% 62.63% 
1993-1999 0.919 0.919 0.908 0.546 98.80% 59.41% 
2000-2002 0.891 0.896 0.887 0.600 99.55% 67.34% 
2003-2007 0.887 0.848 0.880 0.619 99.21% 69.79% 
2008 0.884 0.889 0.872 0.552 98.64% 62.44% 
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Appendix  
Delisting codes in the CRSP Database 
Code Definition 
400 Issue stopped trading as result of company liquidation 
550 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of market makers 
551 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of shareholders 
552 Delisted by current exchange - price fell below acceptable level 
560 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity. 
561 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient (or non-compliance with rules of) float or assets. 
570 Delisted by current exchange - company request (no reason given). 
572 Delisted by current exchange - company request, liquidation. 
573 Delisted by current exchange - company request, deregistration (gone private). 
574 Delisted by current exchange - bankruptcy, declared insolvent 
575 Delisted by current exchange - company request, offer rescinded, issue withdrawn by 
underwriter 
580 Delisted by current exchange - delinquent in filing, non-payment of fees 
581 Delisted by current exchange - failure to register under 12G of Securities Exchange Act 
582 Delisted by current exchange - failure to meet exception or equity requirements. 
583 Delisted by current exchange - denied temporary exception requirement. 
584 Delisted by current exchange - does not meet exchange's financial guidelines for continued 
listing. 
 
